

11/4/62

MY ANSWER TO THAT Q.  
AT THIS TIME WOULD  
NOT BE USEFUL OR HELPFUL.

QUESTIONS ON CUBA

... NOT IN MY AREA  
OF COMPETENCE.

Preparation for  
next session

I. Implementation of the agreement

1. If SAMs stay in Cuba and fire on our planes, how can we maintain aerial surveillance? Will we attack SAMs?
2. If Castro is adamant and no on-the-ground inspection is permitted, how can we be certain weapons are not hidden in caves and woods?
3. What about the IL-28 bombers?
4. What about the rumored Soviet submarine base?
5. Will the agreement collapse if satisfactory verification cannot be arranged -- and with what consequences?
6. Will our quarantine be lifted when the Red Cross or others take its place, even if the missiles are not yet gone?
7. How do we prevent this from occurring again -- will our surveillance, or a UN presence (if <sup>admitted</sup> ~~administered~~), continue forever?

## II. Castro and our pledge against invasion

1. Is there any time limit on our promise not to invade?
2. Are there any implicit conditions?
3. Does it constitute a guarantee of Castro and Communism on the island? An abandonment of our pledge?
4. Does it free Castro's hands for subversion and sabotage elsewhere?
5. Are we requesting any reciprocal guarantee from Cuba?
6. Are we required to stop all actions, large or small, by refugee groups <sup>hoping</sup> ~~trying~~ to liberate their own homeland?
7. Can we go to the aid of one side in the event of a revolution? If it has official status?
8. What if Cuba attacks Guantamano?
9. Will we agree to any inspection or verification of our commitment not to invade -- the "<sup>effective</sup> ~~official~~ guarantee" and "proof" to which they have referred -- or do we expect them to take our word when we won't take theirs?
10. Is this pledge consistent with OAS resolutions? With the Monroe Doctrine?

### III Other issues

1. Does Soviet endorsement of Castro's 5 points spell trouble for us -- or indicate that they are encouraging him in his obstinacy?
2. Is Guantanamo sufficiently important militarily to require our keeping it there, should UN resolutions or other agreements call for its termination?
3. Will Khrushchev's action in Cuba encourage us to find some substitute for our missiles in Turkey?
4. Can we entrust verification to the UN and untrained neutrals?
5. Are we for a nuclear-free zone in Latin America? In Africa? Anywhere else?
6. If the bases are removed, is the Monroe Doctrine still being violated by the Soviet presence in Cuba?
7. Have we lost the confidence of Cuban exiles?
8. What is our attitude on other Soviet weapons in Cuba? Soviet personnel? Soviet domination?
9. Will other U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba be continued, and the new shipping restrictions added?
10. Do results justify using news as "weaponry"?

#### IV. Before the President's speech

1. Had effective action been taken at Bay of Pigs, would this crisis have arisen?
2. Should blockade have been imposed months earlier as weapons moved in?
3. Why was so little credence put in reports of refugees and Keating? If this information also available to President, why did he not check on it, act on it or report on it? Was there a reluctance to act? Was it caused by indecision or divided advice?
4. Why was existence of offensive missiles denied right up to time of President's speech?
5. Why were facts withheld from American people until speech?
6. Why did President conceal from Gromyko his knowledge and concern?
7. Why did we not strike or invade Cuba and take it away from Communism?
8. Was our intelligence effort at fault? Should surveillance have been more complete and constant? How could these bases spring up overnight?
9. Should the President be involved in falsehoods about a "cold"?

## V. Politics

1. Did politics or G.O.P. pressure affect the timing of President's speech -- get him to act -- keep him from disclosing facts earlier?

2. G.O.P. Congressional Campaign <sup>(S) - (C)</sup> ~~corrected~~ statement saying announced reason for blockade "sound <sup>PATENTLY FALSE</sup> ~~tragedy~~ pulse", blockade itself <sup>A</sup> fake, in view of "kid gloves policy toward Cuba for the past 21 months" and this information had been available for months.

### 3. Political effect:

- A. President canceled campaigning for self, Cabinet, et al.
- B. Took pains to consult bi-partisan leaders, Ike, et al.
- C. Refused to exploit success on TV before election.
- D. World will not understand President's set-back at polls.
- E. G.O.P. restrained in attacks because of their actions in 1958-60, as pointed out by our Ambassadors at that time.